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monwealth" will be greatly disappointed by reasons given by the
House of Lords for their decision .
Not that, as we have seen, anyone would quarrel with the re-
sult . However, the double actionability rule outlined by the majori-
ty seems almost the least desirable rule for automobile accident
cases in North America. The efforts by some of the judges to
overcome mechanical rules by invoking a "proper law" did not do
much more towards formulating a new rule . While there may be
a recognition that each type of tort case must be treated differently,
there is still the attempt to formulate one rule for the whole field.
While some of the real issues are hinted at, such vacuous for-
mulas as significant contacts, and governmental interests dis-
couraged the judges from meeting O. Kahn-Freund's call" and
using a new approach of examining the underlying purposes of the
local laws to formulate a new rule which meets the condition of
our time.
M. G. BAER*
CRIMINAL LAW-POLICE PRACTICES-THE RELEVANCE OF EN-
TRAPMENT AS A DEFENCE-PUBLIC DUTY AS NEGATIVING MENS
REA.-Jerome Frank' told us often enough of the difference be-
tween the trial law and appellate court law . One of the factors
(although only one) was the differing treatment of the facts by
the two jurisdictions . The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision
in Ormerod' provides an excellent example of the complexion
which can be placed on a case by the assessment of the facts. The
facts (as expressed by the Court of Appeal) are rather compli-
cated and must be stated at length .
The accused was a nineteen year old youth from a rural com-
munity who had moved to Toronto to take up employment . He
said that he became concerned about drug abuse and particularly
about the use of drugs by a friend . After Ormerod had assisted
policemen in finding two missing girls, these officers arranged a
meeting between Ormerod and Sergeant Rozmus of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) who was told that the ap-
pellant wanted to supply information on marijuana traffickers in
the Yorkville area . Rozmus gave Ormerod telephone numbers
"See e.g. MacDougall, Conflict of Laws in Canada : The Calm Before
the Storm? (1967), 3 U.B.C . L. Rev. 287.
" supra, footnote 1, at p. 141 .
*M. G. Baer, of the Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario.
' See Renerallv, Kristein, ed., A Man's Reach, The Philosophy of Judge
Jerome Frank (1965) .




and a code name to use and advised him not to tell anyone that
he was "working" for the R.C.M.P . Rozmus in his evidence fur-
ther stated :'
The accused appeared to be quite sincere in what he was saying albeit
he had a tendency to exaggerate ; and he indicated that although he
could not offer the accused any protection he could perhaps "help"
him, if the accused was in a place innocently, but not if he was himself
in possession of drugs or took an active part in marijuana activities .
In one of his first meetings with Rozmus, ®rmerod had men-
tioned "Dennis from the Race Track" who supplied drugs. After
about six telephone conversations in the first week, Rozmus dis-
covered that "Dennis" was, in fact, Constable King of the R.C.M.P .
working under cover. Rozmus terminated the relationship after a
few weeks because he discovered Dennis' true identity and because
®rmerod's information was not useful . The appellant claimed that
the communications with Rozmus ceased on the request of Or-
merod's father .
®rmerod was accused, on two counts, of trafficking in mari-
juana under the Narcotic Control Act.' Both transactions were
with King. The first occurred before Rozmus knew "Dennis' "
true identity and the second was subsequent to such knowledge.
The third charge was one of trafficking in a controlled drug
contrary to the Food and Drugs Act.' These pills were also sold
to King .
The appellant claimed that Rozmus told him he could buy
hashish from a third party and recover his money by reselling, but
Rozmus denied this . Another police officer had allegedly told
®rmerod that he should not be surprised if he discovered that
"undercover agents sometimes buy, sell and use drugs to get in-
formation" .
The facts seen through ®rmerod'' eyes may be a little difficult
to believe. McGillivray J.'s assessment may have been correct:'
There was also the possibility that he might be seeking some established
relation with the police in order to disarm observation of his own
activities .
Unfortunately, we do not know enough about police practices
to make a judgment on Rozmus' alleged dealings with ®rmerod.
It seems unlikely, however, that a ,police force of the sophistication
of the R.C.M.P . would explicitly tell a callow youth such as
®rmerod that he was an agent with a licence to buy narcotics.
We must remember, on the other hand, that although Laskin
J.A. may have shared McGillivray J.A.'s suspicions, for the pur-
poses of judicial reasoning, His Lordship was "prepared_ to assume"
®rmerod considered his activities were "bona fide . . . to be in
3 As quoted by Laskin J.A., !bid., at p. 236.
'Narcotic Control Act, S.C., 1960-1961, c. 35.
s Food and Drugs Act, S.C ., 1952-1953, c. 38 .
s Supra, footnote 2, at p. 232.
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furtherance of the police agency".'
Ormerod was convicted on all three charges and sentenced to
six months' imprisonment . The trial judge told the jury that, even
if they accepted Ormerod's story that he honestly believed he had
entered a working relationship with the police, this was no defence.
The Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to decide on the propriety
of this direction.
Before the appellate court, Ormerod argued three issues : that
he had committed no offence because he was acting as an agent
(or honestly believed himself to be doing so) ; that he had no
mens rea because he had no illicit purpose. Finally, he submitted
that even if he had trafficked, he had been entrapped by the police .
Ormerod claimed that he should be acquitted because of a
bona fide belief that he was acting as a police agent. Laskin J.A.
was "prepared to assume" the appellant's bona fides. The learned
judge would not, however, accept the defence, primarily because
the police had no defence in law on the same basis. The private
citizen has no general claim of public duty, partly because the
accused's motives are irrelevant and partly because the police-
man is not excused from criminal liability arising from his own
illegal activities, even if carried out in the pursuit of criminals. The
first point seems clear in the criminal law, no doubt on the as-
sumption that the categories of criminal defences are closed by
the dictates of social policy . Furthermore, the basis of criminal
liability must be an objective one because, otherwise, the criminal
law would be inundated with ad hominem defences which might
do individual justice but would undermine the standards of the
criminal law.
The other argument, that the police are not immune to pros-
ecution, seems less tenable. The occasions on which police officers
have been prosecuted are very infrequent and seem to be limited
to charges laid by disgruntled and detected bootleggers . Laskin
J.A.'s argument that the police must, in effect, come with clean
hands, is not very convincing because they are not in fact charged
when their activities have fallen below the stated moral norm . Of
course, no court, including the Ontario Court of Appeal, has any
control over the prosecutorial discretion to charge police officers
with crime arising from police investigations . The quality of justice
is certainly adversely affected if all supposed police agents and
"entrappes" are convicted and no law enforcers are brought to
trial.
Furthermore, the cases relied and commented upon by Las-
kin J.A . are not very helpful. First, the facts of Ormerod had not
been squarely faced in the earlier cases cited by the Court of
Appeal. Laskin J.A . admits that the facts of Orinerod were pecu-




liar because the appellant claimed to be a police agent who was
charged as the result of activities of another police spy. Most of
the cases cited' by counsel for the appellant were ones in which
the accused had been more in the position of King ("Dennis from
the Dace Track") than that of Ormerod. In most instances, the
accused was acquitted, although it is only fair to add that in only
two cases were narcotics involved . The other cases were liquor
offences where the prosecution was initiated by the victim of the
police subterfuge . Of the two drug cases, only Rex v. Mah Qun
Non' resulted in a conviction . The accused was in the position of
King . He had taken money from apoliceman, to whom an informer
had introduced him, to buy narcotics from a third person . This, of
course, is a straight case of tricking an accused to convict him.
There was no suggestion that he was a police agent. In Rex v.
Hess (No. 1)'° where admittedly the facts were peculiar, the ac-
cused had found a parcel of drugs and claimed he bad physical
possession solely for the purposes of handing them over to the
police . He was acquitted because the court decided he was not in
criminal possession, but was acting out of public duty. Laskin J.A .
saw this as more analogous to the position of King .
His Lordship did not, however, accept the submission that
King was exempted from criminal liability for trafficking by vir-
tue of section 49 of the Narcotic Control Regulations which pro-
vides that : l'
. . . a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police . . . may be in
possession of a narcotic for the purpose of, and in connection with, his
employment therewith .
He ruled that this applied only to simple possession and not
to possession as the result of or in pursuance of trafficking. (There
seems to be some justification for this view from the construction
of sections 47 and 48 of the same Regulations which- describe
Ministerial authorization for purchase of a narcotic "in the public
interest".)
Laskin J.A. took the view that Ormerod would have been in
the same position as the accused in Hess if he had merely had pos-
session for the purpose of handing over the drugs to the authorities .
Similarly, King would not need to rely on section 49 because he
could rely on the decision in Hess . Ormerod was supposedly in
the position of Mah Qun Non. The only way to convict Ormerod
was to rule that no one, including a police officer, has a defence
s E.g ., Rex v. Mah Quit Non, [1934] 1 W.W.R . 78, 47 B.C.R . 464, 65
C.C.C . 151(B.C.C.A.) ; Rex v. Gilmore (1928), 43 B.C.R . 57 (B.C.C.A .) ;
Rex v. Petheran, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 24 (Alta App. Div.) ; and Regina v. Ear
(1966), 49 C.R . 42 (Alta D.C .) .
Ibid.to (1949), 8 C.R . 42, 94 C.C.C . 48, [1949] 1 W.W.R . 577 (B.C.C.A.) .
11 Narcotic Control Regulations, P.C. 1961-1133, S.O.R./61-344.
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to trafficking. It is difficult to understand why Ormerod should be
in a worse position because there were two police agents involved
and not some outsider who bought the drugs. This is certainly
true of the second charge when Rozmus was aware of Dennis'
true identity. If Ormerod could be assumed to be an agent of the
R.C.M.P . and if King was only buying to catch a real trafficker
then there is no crime because no crime existed-Ormerod did
not intend to traffic except for purposes of detection and King only
had possession (or was a party to trafficking per section 21 of the
Criminal Code) for the same purposes.
Admittedly, the trafficking section of the Narcotic Control Act
has been more stringently construed than the possession section"
but the results in some of the cases cited by the Court of Appeal"
seem to indicate that we cannot dispose of Ormerod's guilt simply
by reciting the actus reus of trafficking and dispose of the naens
rea issue by quoting Glanville Williams' statement that : "A crime
may be committed from the best of motives and yet remain a
crime." 14
The Court of Appeal accepted the view that the appellant's ac-
tivities were "bona fide considered to be in furtherance of the
police agency"." Then we are faced with the decision in Hess
which negated mens rea on the basis of public duty and the decision
in Regina v . Benjoe" where an Indian counsellor had taken pos-
session of liquor from an Indian youth in the honest belief that he
had a right to do so within his authority as counsellor . The Sas-
katchewan court acquitted him on the ground that mere possession
was not an offence . Laskin J.A . paraphrased that case in these
terms: "Mens rea in the sense of a blameworthy condition of the
mind or an intention to break the law was a requisite for con-
viction."" How can Benjoe in his honest belief that an Indian
counsellor may do an act which is usually proscribed be treated
any differently from Ormerod who had an honest belief (as ac-
cepted by the Court of Appeal) that he was a police agent? This
argument and the previous comment that Laskin J.A . takes an al-
together too narrow and compartmentalized view of criminal
responsibility receive further support from his subsequent obser-
vation on Benjoe that : "The notion of `public duty', so far as it is
reflected in the case emerges only as an element that supports the
absence of mens rea.""
11 Bearer v. The Queen, [19571 S.C.R . 531, 118 C.C.C . 129, 26 C.R .
193.
13 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 245.
14 Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed., 1961), p. 31 .
15 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 240.
1e (1961), 35 C.R . 157, 130 C.C.C . 238, 34 W.W.R . 463 (Sask. Q.B .) .
"'Supra, footnote 2, at p. 242.
1$ Ibid. Rex v. Petheran, supra, footnote 8, another case cited by the




The criticism has been made that it seems inappropriate to
discuss mens rea as somehow totally separate from the public duty
concept. It is inappropriate because they cannot be so clearly de
fined. The cliché that one can commit crime for the best of
motives is just that-a cliché . No one doubts that a Robin Hood
who steals from the rich and gives to the poor is nevertheless guilty
of crime. One who teaches practical sex education to young girls
from narrow Puritanical family backgrounds will also be punished
for his benevolence. A man who takes it upon himself to expose
municipal fraud in his home town will nevertheless be guilty o£
attempted bribery despite his alleged public-spiritedness ." Surely,
these cases are very different from cases in which properly consti-
tuted authority has established a police force and has allowed its
officers to detect crime and those officers act as undercover agents
and hire informers. It is all very well to say that the police officer
may not act illegally and that he will be liable to prosecution if
he does so, and that the informer will only indulge in illegality at
similar risks. Admittedly, Laskin J.A . gives some hint of his dis-
comfort with the use of discretion by police and prosecution in not
laying .charges when the law enforcers break the law in the exer-
cise of their duties . The occasions on which police officers are
prosecuted in such circumstances are very rare . No one can sug-
gest that the trial judge or appellate court can do anything about
this situation, but if no policemen are in fact charged, does this
mean the courts would formulate new rules about "public duty",
its effect on mens rea, and the formulation of rules on entrapment?
Laskin J.A . explains this in part by stating that, even if the use of
discretion in withholding charges against public officials is wide-
spread, this does not invalidate the principle that their lack of
immunity is a safeguard in appropriate cases. If this safeguard is
worthwhile, then perhaps the least that can be done for defendants
is to ensure that they are similarly safeguarded by judicial discre-
tion, or otherwise, by quashing convictions if the accused has been
unfairly treated in the administration of criminal justice.
The ®rmerod decision is an excellent exercise in the judicial
process, and also accentuates some of the unsolved problems of
criminal procedure in Canada. What route should a judge take in
deciding on ®rmerod's guilt? Should he simply suggest that the
federal Parliament must give serious thought to abolishing the
practice of entrapment or the use of agents provocateurs in a com-
prehensive statute on criminal procedure? Should the trial judge
or the Appeal Court apply the Canadian Bill of Rights" on an ex-
the conviction of the undercover police officer was affirmed because of the
absolute liability of the liquor statute.
"See Smith, [1960] 2 W.L.R. 164 (C.C.A.) and State v . Trophy (1899),
78 Mo . App . 206 (Kansas City C.A .) cited by Laskin J.A ., ibid., at p . 243 .
"S.C ., 1960, c. 44 .
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clusionary basis and declare that such police behaviour offends the
due process of the accused? Should the judge follow the example
of Jessup J.A . in Regina v. Osborn" and, in his discretion, stay the
indictment on the basis of fairness and on the inherent jurisdiction
of the court? Should the judge take the view that the answer must
be found in the substantive criminal law of inens rea and actits
reus? Should the judge take a pragmatic look at police practices
and rule that there is a de facto immunity for entrappers and agents
provocateurs and therefore there should be a de facto defence for the
accused? Or, finally, should the judge recognize the serious social
problem caused by drugs and strictly construe the Narcotic Con-
trol Act and take account of the fact that police officers have wide
powers (for instance, by use of the writ of assistance) under the
Act and that the dangers of drug trafficking should militate against
a liberal interpretation?
Although Canada has no Code of Procedure, this country's
judges are very loath to innovate or to lay down firm rules of
procedure . They are more likely to take up the first suggestion
that if Canada wants to outlaw entrapment, then it is the task of
the legislature, despite the curious lack of procedural legislation
since the passage of the Canadian Criminal Code .
The Bill of Rights is fraught with numerous problems, real
and imaginary, constitutional and practical, and the past nine years
show that the courts are not likely to apply the principles of that
document to problems of criminal procedure unless the issue has
already been resolved by some other agency."
There are few instances of judges acting in quite as direct a
manner as we find in Jessup J.A.'s decision in Osborn . The flavour
of that ruling is, however, frequently used in confession cases . In
explaining his decision to disallow the defence of entrapment,
Laskin J.A . said :"
To uphold the defence . . . it would be necessary for the courts to
exercise a dispensing jurisdiction in respect of the administration of the
criminal law. There is no statutory warrant for such a jurisdiction, but
that does not mean that a Court is powerless to prevent abuses, be
they abuses in the lodging of the prosecution itself or in the establish-
ment of the foundation for the prosecution.
In Ortnerod, Laskin J.A . decided that there was no need to
come to a decision on entrapment simply because he did not con-
sider that it existed in that case . No Canadian case has examined
the ethics of entrapment and the law of the United States had to
"Regina v. Osborn, [19691 1 O.R . 152. 1 D.L.R . (3d) 664, 5 C.R.N.S .
183 (Ont. C.A .) .
22 The first real application was the guarantee of the right to counsel
laid down by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Regina v. Ballegeer (1969),
ï D.L.R . (3d) 74 (Man. C.A .) .




be referred to and in particular, the leading case of Sherman v.
United States." Laskin J.A. seemed to be intent on skirting the
entrapment issue (which perhaps is proper for any court below
the Supreme Court of Canada) as he only makes passing reference
to it and makes the statement cited above. That statement does
not seem to refer to the possibility of an exclusionary rule but to
the much more legislative (or administrative) function of granting
immunity or creating a new defence essentially unrelated to en-
trapment but based on procedures followed by Jessup J.A . in
Osborn . Laskin J.A. suggests that the facts in Sherman v. United
States "differ widely" from those in ®rmerod. This interpretation
is questionable because it would appear that ®rmerod was even
more entrapped (if one can be quantitative about this) unless we
are meant to penalize ®rmerod for volunteering his informing ser-
vices to the police which seems contrary to the spirit of entrap-
ment . The rationale of entrapment is that the police cannot manu-
facture crime for the purpose of apprehending its perpetrator . Let
us consider some statements from the United States Supreme
Court in Sherman v. United States . On the one hand, the follow-
ing statement seems to go against Ormerod :"
When the criminal design originates with the officials of the government,
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to com-
mit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute .
Without becoming involved in a definition of causation, we
are asked to consider who was the originator-of the scheme in
Ormerod . Was it Rozmus, who acquiesced in Ormerod's be
haviour or are we to imagine that a man starts committing a crime
when he offers to help the police convict him of a crime which has
not yet been committed?
Another passage may offer us a little more light:"
. . . the fact that government agents "merely afford opportunities or
facilities for the commision- of the offence does not" constitute entrap-
ment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was "The
product of the creative activity" of law enforcement officials .
Laskin J.A . took the view that it was not entrapment : 27
. . . merely because an undercover policeman provides the opportunity
or gives the occasion for an accused to traffic in narcotics. Moreover, I
cannot say that there was here any such calculated inveigling and per-
sistent importuning of the, accused by Dennis . . , as to go beyond or-
dinary solicitation of a suspected drug seller.
There are problems with this analysis . If we believe Ormerod's
story, which may be a little far fetched but his bona fide belief
24 (1958), 356 U.S. 369 (U.S .S.C .) .
25 ]bid., at p. 372.
26 Ibid.
27 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 238 .
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was at least accepted by the Court of Appeal, then the true en-
trapper was not Dennis but Rozmus and the mere fact that Or-
merod continued his operations was entirely due to Rozmus who
during at least one drug transaction did not know of Dennis'
existence or identity .
The judgment of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman also offers
some useful comments. The Justice, who was joined by Justices
Douglas, Harlan and Brennan pointed out that "conduct is no less
criminal because of the result of temptation, whether the tempter
is a private person or a government agent or informer" . But
Frankfurter J . went further :"
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his
conduct falls outside. the proscription of the statute, but because, even
if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Govern-
ment to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced . . . [and quoting
Justice Holmes] . . . "The Government should not itself foster and pay
for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is
to be obtained. . . . The Federal courts have an obligation to set their
face against the enforcement of the law by lawless means or means
that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice, and to refuse to
sustain such methods by effectuating them."
After this general statement of morality in the administration
of criminal justice, with which Laskin J.A . impliedly agreed, the
United States Supreme Court, per Frankfurter J ., went on to make
a statement which is most useful to Ormerod's case :"
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls
below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of governmental power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask
if the "intention" to commit the crime originated with the defendant
or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product of
"the creative activity" of law enforcement officials . Yet, in the present
case the Court respects and purports to apply these unrevealing tests .
These statements are from concurring judgments in Sherman
v. United States. They are difficult to reconcile and show that a
clear definition of entrapment is yet to emerge . The Frankfurter
interpretation gives the impression that the judicial examination
of police activity is still very much at the discretion of the judge.
If the judge is affronted by the tactics of the police, then he will
allow the defence . Such a rule is basically the same as the method
used by Jessup J.A . in Osborn with the very important difference
that the Osborn ruling has no precedent value .
The totally internal case-by-case discretion exercised in Canad-
ian courts (and most courts of the British Commonwealth) seems
to be the pattern preferred by our system, unless, of course, our
younger professors, lawyers and legislators, who have been strongly
2s Supra, footnote 24, at p. 380 .




influenced by American legal education and the Warren Court,
succeed in entrenching the Bill of Rights and create absolute ex-
clusionary rules . Such a solution may be merely window-dressing
which will have little effect on the lower courts and on local police
forces other than by imposing a loosely-supervised procedural
morality .
Laskin J.A . recognizes this problem when he states at the end
of his judgment:"
I do not, of course, say that these would be the findings if the evidence
was evaluated against the background of a principle of an overriding
judicial discretion to stay a prosecution because of police complicity in
the events which led to it . Nor do I say that such a principle must be
recognized. It may, however, be arguable that it should be, but I leave
consideration thereof to an occasion when it is squarely raised .
Of course, the flavour of English. (and perhaps Canadian)
criminal law is to rely upon mens rea or the principles of respon-
sibility . Many of the cases cited by Laskin J.A . seem to have been
decided on this basis." Most lawyers are wary of this approach
because of the value judgments which are sub-consciously built
into the admittedly difficult formulation of mens rea. Too fre-
quently, this can lead to rationalizations and legalisms and, frankly,
ambiguous decisions . Unfortunately, the Canadian courts, in-
cluding the highest courts such as the Supreme Court of Canada
are not prepared to lay down policy . The most unfortunate illus-
tration of this is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Lemieux
v. The Queen." Laskin J.A . cited this case early in his judgment
as if it were an entrapment case and his citations from Judson J.'s
short judgment seem at first reading to be deliberately ambiguous
to suit -the decision Laskin J.A . wanted to reach in Ormerod.
Such an interpretation of Laskin J .A.'s judgment does the justice
of the Ontario Court of Appeal a grave injustice because Judson
J.A.'s judgment is as ambiguous as it seems. Too frequently, major
policy issues coming before the Canadian Supreme Court are dealt
with in a seemingly cavalier fashion. On such an important issue,
surely this country's highest tribunal can do better than a short
judgment where the substantive law is disposed of in literally one
page.
Lemieux drove the get-away car when he and two others (in-
cluding the informer) forced their way into a house for the pur-
pose of committing larceny. The break-in did not ,happen accord
ing to law because the police had chosen the house with the help
of the informer and the owner had consented to his house being
ao Supra, footnote 2, at p . 247 .ai E.g., Rex v. Gilmore, supra, footnote 8 ; Regina v. Benjoe, supra,
footnote 16 ; Rex v. Petheran, supra, footnote 8 ; Regina v. Ear, supra, foot-
note 8 and Rex v. Hess (No. 1), supra, footnote 10 ." [19671 S.C.R. 492, [19681 1 C.C.C . 187, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 75 (S.C.C .) .
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used for the purposes of trapping Lemieux and his confederates .
Lemieux was totally unaware of these plans . The following re-
marks by Judson J . comprise the total jurisprudence of the case :"
For Lemieux to be guilty of the offence with which he was charged,
it was necessary that two elements should co-exist, (i) that he had
committed the forbidden act, and (ii) that he had the wrongful inten-
tion of so doing. On the assumption on which the appeal was argued
rnens rea was clearly established but it was open to the jury to find that,
notwithstanding the guilty intention of the appellant, the ectus which
was in fact committed, was no crime at all .
This seems to dispose of the case as it would in Ormerod's
case . Laskin J.A . said of the facts in Lemieux : -' "The accused
had no intention of committing such an offence until approached
by the informer who was acting under police instruction." The dis-
tinction between this and Ormerod is rather hard to follow . Or-
merod had even less mens rea than Lemieux as the latter did not
even know he was involved in a police trap and, oblivious of this
fact, Lemieux went ahead with his "intention" .
Mens rea, therefore, seems to be the basis in Lemieux and yet
there is an enigmatic statement by Judson J.A . that :"
Had Lemieux in fact committed the offence with which he was charged,
the circumstances that he had done the forbidden act at the solicitation
of an agent provocateur would have been irrelevant to the question of
his guilt or innocence . The reason that his conviction cannot stand is
that the jury were not property instructed on a question vital to the
issue, whether any offence had been committed .
Therefore, a technical legal argument provides a defence to
Lemieux, with scant discussion of police ethics, -while Ormerod
is convicted . Laskin J.A . took the view that in Lemieux, Judson J.
was saying that "even assuming mens rea . . . it was open to the
jury to find that there was no wrongful act"." This can only be
on the basis that there was no actus reus because of the artificial
quality of the transaction which must also apply to Ormerod.
Note that above, Laskin J.A . had said of Lemieux that he had
"no intention of committing the offence until approached by the
informer" . Yet Judson J.A . was able to say that "solicitation of
an agent provocateur would have been irrelevant to guilt or in-
nocence" ." This is a little difficult to square because what real
difference is there between an owner of a house giving permission
for a crime to be committed on his premises and a police officer
allowing goods to be sold to him . If we are talking about social
danger, there was no difference between Ormerod and Lemieux .
"Ibid., at p . 190 (C.C.C .) .
34 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 239.
'5 Supra, footnote 32, at p. 190 (C.C.C .) .
-"Supra, footnote 2, at p . 239 .




Finally, what did Laskin J.A . mean, in commenting upon this
statement of Judson J. when he said "the reach of the term 'soli-
citation' . . . is, of course, central to the scope of the proposi
tion"?" Is this offering a ray of hope where the question of en-
trapment is, in the opinion of Laskin J.A. squarely raised by the
facts? We must also remember that Judson J. only referred to
agent provocateur.
We are therefore, left with an,ambiguous situation on entrap-
ment . Which possible solution of those outlined above are we left
with? Obviously, Laskin J.A. wanted to make no broad pronounce
ment on entrapment and yet he was also not prepared to base it
on mens rea and took the view that Lemieux was an entrapment
case which hardly seems to be the case .
An appeal from Jessup J.A.'s judgment in Osborn is presently
being considered by the Supreme Court of Canada . Although the
Ontario Court of Appeal may not be overruled, perhaps the scope
of.that court's decision maybe limited. In the meantime, an Ottawa
court has used the Osborn rule to quash an indictment. In Shipley
v. The Queen," the facts show a case which would be clearly
entrapment under United States law. Judge McAndrew quashed
the indictment and cited leading United States decisions on entrap-
ment in Canada . The flavour of the case is that of Osborn where
"criminal equity" was applied.
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